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There has been a growing recognition among scholars that politics matters in the 
distribution of resources in society. However, attempts to use a political economy ‘lens’ 
with which to explore causes of poverty and strategies for poverty alleviation have 
largely ignored elites. By failing to embrace the crucial role elites play in the 
implementation of pro-poor policy, existing research has not produced a holistic 
understanding of the underlying factors which inhibit or promote action towards pro-
poor policy. Historical accounts of the evolution of welfare states in the UK and USA 
inform us that elites prioritization of poverty reduction is driven by the extent to which 
elites and the poor are interdependent, such that the presence of the poor has a positive 
or negative impact on elite welfare. Drawing on research into elite views of poverty and 
the poor in Malawi, this paper argues that in formulating effective, responsive, and 
comprehensive strategies for poverty reduction, the role of elites must be considered in 
addition to the adoption of democratic, economic, and social institutions.  
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1 Introduction 
In the dispute between the advocates of structure and agency, structural explanations 
have dominated explanations of socioeconomic and political behaviour towards poverty 
and determined the solutions that would improve on this problem. In order to promote 
economic growth, accountability, responsiveness, and transparency, developing 
countries have been encouraged to adopt institutions and social policies that are 
supposed to lead to poverty reduction. Developing countries have formulated strategies 
such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and pro-poor budgets that prioritize 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as emphasize empowerment, 
participation by citizens and good governance. Analyses of these strategies reveal the 
anti-political nature taken in finding solutions to the poverty problem. While a lot has 
been written about the ways the poor perceive their situation (Narayan et al. 2000a, 
2000b, 2002), very little is known about the perceptions of poverty held by elites, 
particularly in developing countries, and then how these perceptions impact pro-poor 
policy.  
In studying the causes of poverty, researchers have established correlates between 
poverty and factors such as assets, education, occupation, ethnicity, and geography. But 
they have failed to explain how and why these factors have these effects on poverty and 
have ignored the processes of accumulation, economic distribution, and political power. 
In solving Africa’s problems, the politics, the power of elites, and the distribution of 
resources have been ignored. If politics has entered into poverty discourses, it has been 
in terms of its destructive nature and elites have been characterized as rational, 
calculating and Machiavellian individuals (Robinson 2003: 4) bent on blocking pro-
poor policy or using these resources for personal gain (Riddell 1999: 328).  
There is consensus within much of the literature on poverty that in nations where 
absolute poverty persists, powerful actors conspire to prevent the elimination of poverty 
because they benefit from it (Diamond 2003: 6–7). Other authors add that studying 
elites disregards and diminishes the importance of the perceptions that poor people have 
about their own situation (Narayan et al. 1999; World Bank 2000; Witteveen et al. 
2008). Nevertheless growing poverty and neopatrimonial regimes in many African 
countries have demonstrated the influence elites hold over the adoption, adaption, and 
implementation of institutions and policy prescriptions. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the 
extent to which elite perceptions of poverty and the poor impact the implementation of 
poverty reduction initiatives. It aims to improve our understanding of how and why 
elites support, oppose or ignore the implementation of pro-poor policy. Drawing on both 
quantitative and qualitative data from Malawi, the paper argues that in formulating 
effective, responsive, and comprehensive strategies for poverty reduction, the role of 
elites is essential. Sustainable poverty reduction is dependent upon an elite that is 
committed to and has the political will to promote pro-poor policies. Employing De 
Swaan’s (1988: 13–32) theory of social consciousness as its theoretical base, the paper 
also demonstrates that elites in Malawi are aware of the mutual dependency among 
social groups in society.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a historical account of the 
importance of elites in the implementation of pro-poor policy by drawing on literature 
on the evolution of welfare policies in nineteenth century UK and USA. This     2
literature leads to the main questions of the paper. How do elites talk about the issue of 
poverty and the poor in Malawi? To what extent do elites feel their welfare is impacted 
by the presence of poverty? And how does this impact their preferred solutions to 
poverty? Sections three and four discuss why Malawi offers an interesting case study in 
understanding the role of elites in the politics of pro-poor policy. It points out that 
structural/institutional explanations of and solutions to poverty are inadequate in 
understanding the persistence of poverty in Malawi. Section five analyses the results of 
the study and finds that although elites perceive their ties with the poor to be strong, 
their view of the poor as passive, dependant and fatalistic points to their lack of fear of 
the presence of the poor.  
2  Historical arguments on the role of elites in formulating pro-poor policy 
Elite’s classification of the poor in terms of worthiness has powerfully influenced 
national policies, shifting towards assisting the worthy or deserving poor rather than the 
undeserving poor. Nineteenth century UK and the USA provide examples of this 
distinction among the poor leading to the exclusion of the most vulnerable members of 
society. Elites in these two countries developed ideologies that justified the presence of 
the poor and held the poor responsible for their position in society.  
The images of the poor in the USA reinforced the belief in self-help and the American 
dream, which interprets poverty as a result of personal failure (Lister 2004). Elites 
believed that income, wealth and social position depended wholly on hard work, ability, 
honesty, and responsibility. Similarly, in early nineteenth century UK a distinction was 
made between the dependent and the independent poor; paupers and the labouring poor; 
the deserving and the undeserving poor. ‘This distinction had obvious moral implication 
as well as social and political ones’ (Himmelfarb 1991: 122). It served to protect the 
respectable from the morally undesirable and to facilitate a vast machinery of 
disciplinary social intervention aimed at remoralization (Squires 1990 in Lister 2004) 
with social support targeted at the deserving poor. 
Early theories of the causes of poverty were based on individual and group deficiencies. 
There was a belief that the exercise of the virtues of diligence, prudence, sobriety, thrift, 
and initiative was the pathway to affluence. Therefore, poverty was caused by defects of 
character which the individual could, if they chose, overcome. ‘Although hazards of life 
such as unemployment, sickness, old age, death of the breadwinner was acknowledged, 
it was the mark of a provident man that he set aside savings to cover these risks’ 
(Berthoud 1981: 7). However, it was later recognized that among those in poverty were 
decent, hard working, good living, and provident people, who in spite of personal effort 
were defeated by successive and prolonged crises beyond their control. This led to a 
categorization of poor people between the deserving, who were poor due to no fault of 
their own and the undeserving, those whose poverty was due to character defects such 
as laziness, drunkenness, and immorality. 
This categorization of the poor became a way of ranking or prioritizing the poor 
according to need and had an influence on which policies targeted which category of 
poor people as well as the way in which resources were allocated (Hossain 2005). Lister 
(2004) lists three ways in which distinctions were made in categorizing the poor: 
(a) Between pauperism and poverty between which dividing line was thin and 
permeable as individuals slipped across the two. Hence welfare policy attempted 
to prevent the poor from lapsing into pauperism;    3
(b) Between undeserving, able-bodied, and the deserving impotent/incapable 
paupers, which resulted in relief that was restricted to absolute necessities and 
provided in a form that deterred the recipients from desiring to remain dependent 
upon it and deterred others from conduct that would result in destitution 
(Berthoud 1981);  
(c) The third differentiation was aimed at charting and containing the dangerous and 
criminal class, who invoked fear of criminality, vice, sexual immorality, 
pollution, and a threat to the social order. Therefore, the poor were to be kept at 
a distance as they were feared as a source of both physical and moral filth and 
contamination. 
This last point illustrates the realization by elites of the impact the presence of the poor 
has on elite welfare. Implicit in Lister’s (2004) argument is the fact that when people 
settle in one territory, develop resources and build up stocks, they develop mutual 
dependencies. Interdependence is best illustrated by nineteenth century Europe where it 
was realized that the mass outbreak of cholera was a result of the living conditions 
among the urban poor. The first solution by elites was to move from those areas 
populated by the urban poor into suburbs, leading to the creation of slums. Elites soon 
recognized that in order to prevent the spread of diseases beyond the slums and insulate 
themselves from diseases, they must provide fresh water and sewerage connections to 
these slums (De Swaan 1988).  
In some instances welfare support did not necessarily target the poorest, but the slightly 
or temporarily poor, further accentuating the preference for the deserving poor. 
Historical examples include, welfare support towards the members of the upper castes 
during the 1943 Bengal famine and assistance for the Victorian Londoners threatened 
with descent into the ranks of the unrespectable (Himmelfarb 1991). Today, this still 
exists, for example, in Bangladesh, where the sudden downward mobility of a 
household receives more sympathy and has a strong likelihood of accessing national 
health programmes (Hossain 2005). Similarly, the political discourse in Ghana reveals a 
strong bias towards the economically active, leaving the poorest excluded from poverty 
programmes (Hickey 2005; Hossain 2005). This illustrates that policy, particularly pro-
poor policy, is not always a result of benevolence or altruism, but also self-interest and 
rarely an expression of pure humanitarian impulse’ (Toye 1999).  
Research carried out in the UK and USA has underlined the importance these 
perceptions or images of the poor have had on the development of punitive attitudes and 
policies towards welfare recipients (Lister 2004). Studies have underscored the 
important linkages that exist, not only between politics and pro-poor policy, but also 
between those with power within the policy-making process, their perceptions and 
outcome of such policies. They show that agency-based explanations that focus on what 
people in poverty do or do not do are inadequate for dealing with poverty. Rather, there 
is a need to focus on agency-based explanations that turn our attention towards what 
powerful people do or do not do and the impact of their actions. ‘While the actions of 
individuals in poverty can be a contributory factor, the underlying causes of poverty are 
to be found in the wider society. We need to pay more attention to the exercise of 
agency of poor people, but this cannot be divorced from their severely disadvantaged 
structural position or from the exercise of agency by more powerful actors, which helps 
to perpetuate that structural position’ (Lister 2004: 178). 
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3  Elites, politics, and policy in Malawi 
Malawi offers an interesting case study for understanding the importance of elites in the 
politics of pro-poor policy, given its unsuccessful attempts at reducing poverty. Malawi 
is known for developing good policies targeted at reducing poverty that are rarely 
implemented successfully. A study of the budget process in Malawi concluded that the 
budget process is a theatre that masks the real distribution and spending (Rakner et al. 
2004). There is no realistic estimate of revenue or spending in the planning, formulation 
and implementation of the budget. Malawi’s transition from an authoritarian one-party 
state towards a democratic form of government is considered a ‘transition without 
transformation’ because many structures, systems, and personalities have remained the 
same (Cammack 2004). Most importantly, the expected impact democracy would have 
on poverty reduction has been minimal.  
The transition towards democracy in Malawi brought with it expectations for the 
attainment of various freedoms and also a time when poverty could openly be discussed, 
examined, and solutions implemented. But since 1994, despite the implementation of 
various pro-poor policies the level of poverty is still high and inequality even higher. 
Three years into democratic rule Malawi faced two food crises, fiscal instability, and 
political intimidation similar to the one-party era resulting in the withdrawal of aid by 
donors. The rhetoric that democracy will result in development, equitable distribution of 
resources and good governance is not consistent with the reality in Malawi. This is 
typical of many African countries; despite political changes and the adoption of better 
governance institutions, there is little evidence that these changes have resulted in more 
effective, accountable, and responsive governments (Chabal 2002).  
In this section I argue that the adoption of democratic institutions does not alone suggest 
a change in elite behaviour or in the actions they take. The persistence of poverty 
reflects its institutionalization within social and political norms as well as institutions 
and its acceptance within political discourse. Hence, noble agendas – such as 
empowerment of the poor, or increased political space for the poor to participate in – 
offer very little promise if the elites who are required to adopt and implement these 
institutions are anyhow ignored. The welfare impact of these institutions is a result of 
how elites choose to exercise their influence or power. The answer lies in the 
reallocation of resources and shifting power relations within which poverty is embedded 
and tolerated. ‘The inclusion of the poor in participatory poverty assessments, may have 
little weight compared to the ways in which poverty and the poor are represented within 
elite political discourse’ (Hickey and Bracking 2005: 854). 
Malawi is known for developing good policies for poverty reduction that are rarely 
implemented successfully. Because key initiatives are often introduced by presidential 
candidates and other ‘big men’ on the campaign trail, their viability beyond these 
political campaigns is limited. Policies adopted are short-term in nature with no 
technical analysis and input or institutionalized decision-making. Personality politics 
prevents co-ordination within government, while the tailoring of policies and their 
implementation in order to maximize opportunities for personal enrichment or to pay off 
political debts compromises their effectiveness. Unnecessary AIDS deaths and needless 
starvation have been among the consequences (Booth et al. 2006). 
Despite heavily investing in food security by both government and the donor 
community, Malawi still experiences recurrent food crises. One explanation for 
Malawi’s recurrent food security problems is its failure to become a developmental 
state. In developmental states political and bureaucratic elites have incentive to promote   5
economic growth, in order to catch up or to protect or promote itself as well as win 
legitimacy by delivering steady improvements in the material and social well-being of 
its citizens (Cammack 2006: 1). Therefore, understanding elites and the role they play in 
the politics of pro-poor policy is important. 
Three issues in Malawi make understanding elites important as they point to the failure 
of the political system argument to fully explain the success or failure of pro-poor 
policy. First, democracy has had minimal impact on poverty and has not empowered the 
poor. Second, democracy has not resulted in an accountable or responsive government. 
Instead neopatrimonial practices have continued from the one party to a democratic 
state. Last, democracy has not changed the nature of Malawi’s traditional society. Thus, 
social relationships are still characterized by inequality and a large power distance. 
Citizens gladly defer to authority which makes it difficult or impossible for the poor to 
hold elites to account. This explains why abuses are tolerated even when few benefits 
trickle down to poor people (Booth et al. 2006).  
The structural underpinnings of Malawi’s political system of neopatrimonialism have 
changed little under democracy. Leaders continue to use patronage and clientelism to 
retain power and legitimacy (Cammack et al. 2007; O’Neil 2007). The only difference 
was the one-party state led by Kamuzu Banda did not practice a free-for-all patronage. 
He retained tight control over the allocation of power and wealth. By contrast, the 
democratic rule of Bakili Muluzi lost control of the patronage system such that it 
became a free-for-all and led to an increase in corruption at all levels within the civil 
service. The second democratic president, Bingu Wa Mutharika inherited the leadership 
styles of both Muluzi and Banda to build personal and political support. Bingu has 
reached out to civil society, the media, taken a zero-tolerance stand on corruption but at 
the same time adopted populist policies such as input subsidies and road-building to 
gain support. He has also used patronage, especially the promise of public office 
appointments to encourage opposition politicians to join his party (Cammack et al. 
2007).  
The argument that democracy is better for development than authoritarianism has not 
been consistent with Malawi’s experience. Democracy in Malawi has had a differential 
impact on the poor and it is the particular choices that the elites in Malawi have made 
that have influenced the nation’s institutions and development prospects. These leaders 
have differed in their approach towards policy especially on policy consistency, long-
term vision, ability to discipline and coordinate both donors and different arms of 
government in line with their vision, prioritization of objectives and resources, and the 
improved performance of the civil service (Booth et al. 2006; Cammack et al. 2007). 
The way in which institutions are used or implemented is dependent on the choices of 
elites. Elites are the missing link in explaining the success or failure of pro-poor policy 
and understanding their perceptions, ideas,, and attitudes in conjunction with capacity 
training, good governance, and democratic reforms are essential. Perceptions dictate 
behaviour, therefore pro-poor policies are a reflection of how elites perceive them; in 
other words, poverty reduction begins in the minds of elites. Perceptions provide the 
fabric in which public initiative can be sewn and can become entangled. They shape or 
constrain leaders’ decisions by creating the space for addressing issues, the nature of the 
approach to deal with them and set of solutions to be considered (Selee 2005). 
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4  Poverty trends and pro-poor policies in Malawi 
According to the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) of 1997/1998 and 2004/2005, 
there has been very little change in the rate of poverty since 1998. Malawi remains one 
of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa with 52.4 per cent of the population poor 
and 22.3 per cent ultra-poor. These figures are according to the World Bank poverty line 
of those living below US$1.25 a day. This indicates that one in five people lives in dire 
poverty such that they cannot even afford to meet the minimum food requirement (NSO 
2005). Malawi’s per capita income has grown by only 0.2 per cent per annum over the 
last 30 years despite attempts by successive governments and donors to improve the 
lives of the poor. In addition to being poor, Malawi faces several challenges, among 
them the AIDS pandemic, chronic malnutrition, declining soil fertility, shortages of land 
and inadequate agricultural policies (Conroy 2006; Action Aid 2006).  
Poverty in Malawi is a reflection of both economic underdevelopment and the failure of 
pro-poor policies, either in the ways that resources are distributed or policies are 
implemented and whether the policies address the real causes of poverty. Hence, 
poverty in Malawi is experienced through unemployment and through a lack of access 
to resources or social services such as access to education, health services, food etc. 
Thus, location is an important indicator of a person’s level of poverty. For instance, 60 
per cent of the rural population is living in poverty compared to 25 per cent in urban 
areas. This is mainly because the rural areas are less developed than urban areas in 
terms of roads, schools, health centres, and business centres. Additionally, agricultural 
policies implemented in Malawi over the past forty years have increased inequality. 
The fact that poverty is more pronounced the rural areas does not negate the fact that 
urban poverty is also severe. High urbanization since the 1980s (from 8 per cent in 1975 
to 25 per cent in 2000) has meant increased population in the urban areas. High 
urbanization has not been matched by a growth in employment levels, but worsening 
urban life and increasing slums in Malawi’s cities. Urban unemployment has therefore 
increased as only 30,000–35,000 jobs are created each year for 200,000 job seekers 
(USAID 2002). Without employment people are unable to pay for services such as 
health, education, or clean water, and are also vulnerable to inflation. USAID (2002) 
observes that in urban settings there has been escalating cases of armed robberies in 
offices, homes, and car thefts. This suggests that there is a link between the level of 
poverty and social ills in society. The people targeted are usually the better-off of which 
elites are a part, suggesting a mutual dependency between elites and the poor. This 
interdependence between the elites and poor becomes central to the collectivizing 
process that drives policies towards poverty.  
In order to grasp the extent to which structural or agential factors explain 
socioeconomic and political behaviour, it is important to understand the policies that 
have been implemented in Malawi since attaining independence in 1964 and their 
impact on poverty. Structural arguments emphasize the impact of the political system 
prevailing governance institutions and the rule of law. Structural arguments have largely 
been used to explain socioeconomic and political behaviour and its impact on poverty. 
Thereby ignoring the role of agency to act and influence policy, particularly the role of 
elites. However, structures or institutions have different outcomes for the poor and 
agency accounts for this difference. This leads us to focus more on the role that elites 
play in the politics of pro-poor policy. 
A discussion of how various democratic governments in Malawi have implemented pro-
poor polices reveals factors that have resulted in their success or failure. Factors include   7
external shocks; over reliance on agriculture; failure to diversify the economy; 
geographic location; poor infrastructure; and low educational levels. Other factors 
include weak governance, corruption, and poor macroeconomic management. These 
factors point to the importance of decision-making by ruling elites and the choices they 
make in regards to the nature of pro-poor policies implemented.  
Following independence in 1964, Malawi, under the autocratic leadership of Kamuzu 
Banda, implemented various strategies guided by two major policies: Devpol 1 and 
Devpol 2. Banda’s policies were aimed at attaining economic independence, therefore 
many social sectors such as health and primary education were sidelined or ignored. 
Instead, emphasis was put on increasing agricultural productivity, export earnings, and 
domestic income to ensure the availability of needed skills. Secondary, technical, and 
university education were prioritized at the expense of primary school education (Pryor 
1990). These policies reveal Banda’s value orientation which prioritized economic 
growth over direct welfare support. The official view of the Banda regime was that as 
long as every Malawian was well fed, lived in a house which did not leak and had 
adequate clothing, there was no poverty (Chinsinga 2002). 
The manner in which Banda implemented his policies also had a damaging impact on 
the level of poverty and inequality. Policy was dualistic in nature and gave preferential 
treatment towards the estate sector at the expense of the smallholder sector. The estate 
sector, which was dominated by elites, grew rapidly. The bias in Banda’s policy took 
several forms: customary land was annexed from the smallholder sector; smallholder 
farmers were not allowed to grow export crops such as tobacco, tea and sugar; and they 
were paid less for their produce by the estate marketing board (Conroy 2006; Chinsinga 
2002).  
This approach institutionalized poverty. On the one hand there were Malawians that had 
unlimited access to land, could grow any crops, had free market policies and access to 
commercial credit. On the other hand, were Malawians restricted to growing less 
productive crops, the prices of their produce was determined by the government and 
they were paid lower wages for their labour (Kennedy 1996). The natural disasters that 
hit Malawi in the late 1970s worsened the situation of smallholders and at the same time 
decreased social spending. The poverty situation was worsened as Malawi adopted 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in 1981. 
Despite the government’s priorization of productive over social sectors, there were 
some notable improvements in social indicators. For instance ‘infant mortality declined 
from 200 per 1,000 in 1964 to 130 and per capita daily calorie intake increased from 
2,250 in 1964 to 2,400 in 1975’ (AFRODAD 2007: 18; Booth et al. 2006). GDP grew 
by an average of 8 per cent between 1965–73 (World Bank 1975). By 1981 Malawi had 
raised its domestic investment from 9 per cent of GDP at independence to 25 per cent 
while domestic savings increased to 17 per cent (Record 2007).  
The benefits of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s did not reduce poverty. By the 
early 1990s, 63 per cent of the population remained under the poverty line (UN 1993). 
This situation underpinned the policies implemented from 1994 under the democratic 
leadership of Bakili Muluzi who was a former secretary general of Banda’s party. There 
was a major shift in policy orientation towards poverty reduction. Allocations towards 
social sectors such as health and education received a major boost in the budget. The 
government introduced free primary education which increased enrolment, especially 
that of girls (Nthara 2003). The Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) designed in 1994 
guided policy to be achieved through a participatory process with the poor that   8
empowered them to change their livelihoods (Kennedy 1996; Chinsinga 2002). Despite 
being well-articulated, the PAP had little impact on actual programmes and expenditure 
decisions. It failed to define the target groups or stakeholders and there was no real 
understanding of who the poor were, what poverty was, and the specific solutions to be 
applied to different dimensions of poverty (Chinsinga 2002; Bloom et al. 2005).  
Ellis et al. (2003) observe that by 1999, Malawi had abandoned the PAP and adopted 
the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP), which became fully 
operational in 2002. This approach was built around four pillars: sustainable pro-poor 
economic growth; human capital development through education and health; improving 
the quality of life of the most vulnerable through safety nets; and good governance. A 
distinguishing feature of the MPRSP was its commitment to the classification of certain 
budget lines under the programme as Pro-poor Expenditure (PPE), these were to be 
protected against cuts. Despite these efforts the MPRSP failed to have its desired 
impact, resources were diverted to non-priority areas. In 2003 instead of the projected 
increase in PPE expenditure to 25.2 per cent, there was a decline of 9.2 per cent (IMF 
and IDA 2003; GoM 2005).  
Muluzi’s two terms in office have been described as the ‘lost decade’ since no real 
economic growth took place. Between 1995 and 1998 Malawi’s growth rate averaged 
4.6 per cent per annum; dropped to 1.4 per cent between 1998 and 2001; and was 
negative between 2001 and 2002. Fiscal indiscipline characterized this period with the 
government spending more than its revenues and grants, thereby increasing internal and 
external debt. Domestic debt increased from MK9.5 billion at the end of 2001 to 
MK54.5 billion early 2004 and interest on this debt alone accounted for 10 per cent of 
the national budget (Whitworth 2004 in Conroy 2006). At the time Muluzi left office in 
2004 GDP per capita remained at US$160, the same level as when he assumed office in 
1994. This is a clear indication of the poor living conditions of most Malawians, 
especially if we account for population growth. The expectations that democracy 
offered to the poor and the economy in general did not materialize.  
In response, the second democratic government elected in 2004 embarked on a growth-
oriented strategy that acknowledged the need to effectively reduce poverty. Guided by 
the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), it focuses on six priority areas: 
agriculture and food security; irrigation and water development; transport and 
communication; infrastructure development; prevention and management of nutritional 
disorders; HIV and AIDS (Government of Malawi 2008). Since 2006 growth has 
averaged 7.5 per cent, which has been supplemented by social protection policies such 
as the subsidy programme, cash transfers towards female/child-headed households and 
old age pensions. The cash transfers are still being piloted while old age pensions have 
yet to be implemented. 
As a result of such policies, inflation has been below 10 per cent since 2007 and there 
has been an increase in maize production. The increase in maize production is attributed 
to the implementation of the subsidy programme since 2005 (Chinsinga and O’Brien 
2008). Prior to implementing the social protection policy, policies towards poverty had 
been ad hoc, mainly short-term relief or emergency support. There have been some 
extensive programmes, particularly the subsidized agricultural input programme but 
resources were thinly spread and failed to have the desired impact on poverty. 
According to Tsoka and Slater (2007) the social protection policy initiative is a more 
long-term predictable social protection programme that helps poor households deal with 
risks and shocks with a more institutionalized and coordinated approach (Tsoka and 
Slater 2007: 7).   9
These changes in government policies—particularly the emphasis on subsidies, which 
have been fully budgeted for in the national budget while cash transfers are still being 
piloted and old age pensions are yet to be implemented—raise questions as to how elites 
perceive poverty, its causes and solutions. Elites represent a group that is actively 
involved in policy-making and the literature shows that the way elites define or frame 
the problem of poverty has an impact on the solutions they proffer. Although, elite 
perceptions are not the singular explanation for understanding poverty, its causes and 
solutions, the political nature of poverty makes elites’ perceptions important.  
5  Elite understanding of poverty and the poor  
The fieldwork on which this paper is based was undertaken in 2008. The objectives of 
the study point to the importance of views expressed by elites about poverty and poor 
people as well as their attitudes, values, and norms. Some research has been carried out 
in Malawi on elite capture1 but none has attempted to understand elite perceptions,2 —
how they affect pro-poor policy and how they can possibly be changed to the benefit of 
poor people.  
The study is interested in powerful individuals, those who are in decision-making 
positions and those who exercise influence over decisions that involve the 
implementation of pro-poor policy. Elites are defined here as the most powerful people 
within any political system who are able to influence or shape political and economic 
decisions. Hence a positional approach towards identifying the sample of elites was 
used. The positional approach is based on the assumption that power in society is based 
on resources associated with positions of authority. Therefore, holders of key positions 
in political, public or private institutions are identified as belonging to the elite 
(Hoffman-Lange 1987). The adoption of a positional approach ensured that few elites 
were missed in the process of sampling, making it more inclusive. The target group was 
individuals that hold key positions within institutions that directly influence pro-poor 
policy, for instance the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning, the Ministry 
of Finance, local government, and so on. However, it also included other 
ministries/departments that were indirectly involved in the planning of pro-poor policy 
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, principal secretaries in the President’s office 
and cabinet as well as advisors to the president. Those targeted were ministers, principal 
secretaries, members of parliament from the ruling party, members of parliament in 
opposition, heads of media organizations, heads of civil society organizations, donor 
agencies, and heads of parastatals.  
A 100 individuals were given a questionnaire and 60 were asked for face-to-face 
interviews.3 The respondents were requested to provide information on their 
understanding of poverty, its causes and strategies, their attitudes and value orientations 
including their sociodemographic information.  
                                                 
1  Elite capture is the assumption made in much of the literature that the obstacle to successfully 
implement policy, particularly pro-poor policy, lies in the kleptocratic behaviour of elites. 
2  Elite perception comprise of evaluative and non-evaluative understanding of a situation. Perception 
refers to three things: cognition (non-evaluative understanding); norms (internalized ideas about 
appropriate roles and values (ideals about what might be) (Reis and Moore 2005:3). 
3  Of the 100 questionnaires sent out 86 were returned and of the 60 requests for interviews, 52 were 
interviewed.    10
In addition to the interviews, a review of official records was carried out which included 
proceedings of parliament’s budget sessions between 1965 and 2007, newspaper articles 
between 1996 and 2008, and presidential speeches sourced from the Malawi 
Broadcasting Corporation covering the three main presidents since 1964 (Dr Banda 
(1964–91); Dr Muluzi (1994–2004); and Dr Wa Mutharika (2004–08)). The review 
concentrated on understanding how the issues concerning poverty and the poor were 
discussed, how pro-poor policy was analysed and tried to understand whether specific 
events impacted on elite support for pro poor policy. Observations were integrated into 
the study to capture what elites actually do or say rather than what they say they do and 
it provided additional information or insight into elite perceptions, level of collective 
action, and coordination. The following section presents elite perceptions of poverty and 
the poor and analyses the extent to which mutual dependencies between elites and the 
poor impact policy support. 
5.1  Extreme poverty but a visible happy rural poor and an invisible suffering 
urban poor 
Malawian elites are well aware of the problem of poverty and consider it to be the most 
important issue facing Malawi. A majority of the respondents in the semi-structured 
interviews opened the discussion with the fact that poverty is real, severe, rampant and 
is a problem for Malawi’s development. They were not under any illusions as to the 
incidence, severity, and location of poverty. When asked to indicate what the main 
obstacles to democracy were, social issues were ranked the highest (Table 1). When the 
question referred to national problems elites still ranked social issues as the main 
problems. Table 2 shows that poverty was the top choice for elites followed by 
education and health. More than half of the respondents selected other social issues as 
well as unemployment and income distribution.  
It is not surprising that elite estimates of the level of poverty are higher than the official 
statistics. Table 3 shows that contrary to the official view that poverty is declining in 
Malawi some elites indicated that with the exception of a few elites, the whole nation is 
poor. Elites within the civil service indicated that to be politically correct they would 
peg poverty at a little over 50 per cent, but when they felt in earnest that it was over 65 
per cent. As one influential high-ranking government official stated that ‘to be realistic 
Table 1: Obstacles to democracy 
   Yes No  Total 
Low educational levels  64  22  86 
High levels of poverty  61  25  86 
Lack of party tradition  32  54  86 
Incompetence of those in power  11  75  86 
Selfishness of elites  36  50  86 
Political clientelism  24 62 86 
Power centralized in the Executive  32  54  86 
High inflation rate  0  86  86 
Source: see text.   11
70 per cent of Malawians are poor’. Elites noted that the data being used to tabulate the 
official statistics was collected several years back and does not represent poverty in 
2008. They argued that people’s needs have changed and the present estimation of 
poverty is based on an international understanding which does not reflect the local 
understanding of poverty. Elites’ high estimation of the extent of poverty suggests two 
things: one, that there is interdependence between elites and the poor such that elites are 
not shielded from the realities of poverty. Second, this can aid attempts to introduce 
policy that will actually reduce poverty and ensure the political will to implement these 
policies. According to Reis and Moore (2005) the use of the poverty line in the UK, by 
Charles Booth (1889) was able to inspire support from elites towards the poor which has 
not occurred in Malawi. The mere presentation of poverty as ‘those living below a 
dollar a day’ has worked to desensitize Malawian elites.  
 
Table 2: Malawi’s most important problems 
   Yes  No  Total 
Inflation 26  60  86 
Education and health  64  22  86 
Poverty 77  9  86 
Governability 40  46  86 
Income distribution  47  39  86 
Political patronage/clientelism  44  42  86 
Corruption 62  24  86 
Behaviour of the elites  34  52  86 
Moral crisis  28  58  86 
Unemployment 53  33  86 
Foreign dependency  45  41  86 
Other social issues  58  28  86 
Other political issues  31  55  86 
Other economic issues  26  60  86 
Source: see text. 
Table 3: Elite estimate of poverty  
 





Missing value  35.8 
Total interviewed  52100 
Source: see text.   12
This could be because the poverty line in Malawi is calculated based on   
food expenditures in relation to individual food requirements and critical non-food 
consumption (IHS 2005). Hence, elite’s description of poverty is in terms of lack of 
access to basic needs, mostly food, shelter, clothes, and foot wear. Lack of access to 
social services such as health, water, and education were seen as secondary to basic 
needs. Poverty was hardly discussed in terms of the socioeconomic relations that keep 
people poor, such as access to land, empowerment or participation in decision-making. 
Despite their high estimations of poverty, elites will not likely be shocked by poverty in 
Malawi as they see it as a result of the poor’s inability to do what is necessary to reduce 
their poverty. The reason that the poor face hunger is because they do not work hard and 
fail to be innovative due to illiteracy.  
This view of the poor is evident in elite categories of the poor which are also similar to 
those prevalent in the international discourse on poverty. The poor were ranked as either 
ultra poor, i.e. those who lack all the basic necessities of life, have no labour, and 
survive on a day-to-day basis. The second group was that of poor people who have the 
energy and ability but lack the economic or social opportunities to live a decent life. The 
last group is that which is considered better off in relation to the rest of the community. 
This group can afford at least one meal a day, some form of clothing, and can access 
markets. However, elites pointed out that in comparison to international standards of 
poverty, all three groups still fall below the poverty line. These three categories divide 
the active and the inactive poor, which determined the policies to be targeted towards 
each group. Though, not in support of welfare transfers, the ultra poor were those that 
could be targeted by cash transfers as they need help all the time. The elderly, children, 
and the disabled were identified as belonging to this group. The last two groups were 
seen as qualifying for subsidy or cash for work programmes as they have energy and 
ability.  
An interesting contrast emerged on the location of the poor between the rural and urban 
areas. Elites argued that although there are more poor people in the rural areas, the pain 
of poverty is felt in the urban areas. There was an idealized view of the rural poor, who 
were described as ‘comfortably poor’ and better able to survive because of access to 
land. The rural poor were seen as having a good support system because they live 
among kin who can easily share with them. In contrast, the urban poor have no access to 
the family support system because those whom they interact with are strangers also 
trying to survive. However, it is believed that the urban poor are surrounded by 
resources and opportunities and all they need to do is work hard. By default if one is 
poor in urban areas then he is deemed lazy. As one respondent noted ‘in urban areas the 
poor have opportunities and if they had a little imagination they should not be poor’. 
Elites noted that social policy has mainly targeted rural poor because poverty is more 
visible. Not only in terms of numbers (85 per cent of Malawians live in rural areas) but 
also in the outlook of the poor, who are scantily dressed and look hungry and dirty. The 
urban poor become invisible because they are at the edge of the suburbs and they may 
have better clothing to put on. 
Elite responses indicated that urban poverty has not been seriously considered by the 
elite and that there is an idealized view of the rural poor. There was a tendency to forget 
the poverty in their own midst and to assume that social ties in the rural areas are still 
strong. Some elites argued that just like in urban areas, in the rural areas it is survival of 
the fittest.  
These days you hardly see the stratification that used to be there in the 
rural areas. Because in the past you could go into the rural areas and   13
immediately notice that there are some people who are slightly better off 
and those that are not doing so well. But now a common response from 
the people out there is that we are all poor, there is no difference between 
the rural and urban poverty, especially if poverty is in those traditional 
settlement areas (interview with academic, May 2008).  
Malawi is considered to be a highly unequal country, at times likened to levels of 
inequality in Brazil and considered the highest in Africa (Durevall 2002). Inequality in 
Malawi had been steadily rising from 1968 at a Gini index of 0.48 to 0.62 in 1995 and 
0.88 in 1998. Respondents held similar views that there is a wide gap between the rich 
and the poor in Malawi in terms of income, gender, access to productive resources such 
as land and access to social services such as education. Structural explanations that 
emphasize power differentials in society were used by elites to explain gender and 
access to basic services inequality. For instance stereotypes in Malawi’s tradition and 
upbringing were seen to worsen gender inequality as women are posited as inferior to 
men. Interestingly, a more individualistic approach was applied when discussing income 
inequality. Elites argue that there is equality of opportunities and the poor make bad 
choices. One minister pointed out that income inequality is only beginning to show 
because the rural poor spend their time working on other people’s land rather than in 
their own gardens; ‘The rural poor prefer to make money for the day, therefore the rich 
become richer and the poor poorer’.  
Elites felt that inequality does not lead to any form of unrest because poverty has been a 
constant companion for Malawians. ‘It is like a tradition, to be poor and not to have 
access to basic needs is the order of the day, it is normal, it is the way things are. Poor 
people are resigned to their fate’ (interview with civil society leader, April 2008). On 
the other hand, the poor cannot organize for mass action because as Malawians we 
organize vertically instead of horizontally and any mass action dies a natural death 
without achieving its intended impact. Poor people consider relationships with MPs or 
those in authority within the civil service as more important and they will conspire with 
those in authority, hence report any plans for mass action. The poor are seen as letting 
‘sleeping dogs lie’ to preserve communal life where the poor and elites are dependent 
on each other.  
5.2  The main causes of poverty 
Answers about the causes of poverty converged on the low levels of education of the 
Malawian people, which has resulted in high illiteracy rates. Poverty reduction policies 
were seen as meaningless if the recipients are uneducated. Education is what determines 
the extent to which the poor will use the resources made available to them and their 
attitude towards development. Education referred not only to higher education but also 
to entrepreneurial training which would enable the poor to develop innovative ideas to 
use the available resources. ‘Education is the key as it impacts on the attitudes of the 
poor and if people are educated, then they have a positive attitude towards development’ 
(statement by top government official).  
Elite diverged on the impact that behaviour and attitudes of the poor have on poverty 
levels in Malawi. Some stressed that the position of the poor was not due to a fault of 
their own. This group stressed that many of the poor are hard working but that they have 
not been empowered through training or with resources, both land and financial, to 
make their lives better. Others argued that the poor are unproductive and lazy leaving a   14
situation where an unproductive 70 per cent of the population depends on the productive 
30 per cent.  
Of the respondents that mentioned laziness and lack of hard work directly, they related 
these behaviours to the poor’s passive mentality, culture of dependence, their view of 
poverty fate, and generally holding values negative for development. Other frequent 
answers included lack of minerals like diamonds and gold that can spur growth and 
most importantly Malawi’s dependency on agriculture. Respondents noted that Malawi 
has been heavily dependent on agriculture for decades, but still uses primitive methods 
of farming which results in poor yields. ‘We are still using a hoe, we have not 
mechanized and we have huge resources of water but we have not gone into massive 
irrigation schemes. We still wait for the rain and hence only plant once a year’ (member 
of parliament). This view of the poor as passive and dependent highlights the 
relationship that elites have with the poor and also explains in part the lack of fear elites 
have from the presence of poverty and the poor.  
In addition, poor policy implementation, lack of political will, corruption, and bad 
governance were considered to also be causes of poverty in Malawi. Respondents 
suggested that many policies were designed to please donors rather than the Malawian 
people, making them a failure from the planning stage. Others noted that the donor 
argument was just an excuse to divert attention from the source of the problem—the 
elites. They argued that the amount that Malawi receives from donors is not 
proportionate to the development that one sees on the ground. ‘Donors are   
not responsible for our poverty; the government has implemented structural adjustment 
programmes, poverty alleviation policy, MPRSP, MDGs, and the Malawi growth 
development strategy with no real impact on poverty. Instead of developing policy 
based on these previous policies, elites are requesting to travel to Brazil and South 
Africa, to study their social protection policy’ (interview with prominent leader, 
parliament, April 2008).  
5.3  Strong ties, minimal observable threat 
Elites distinguished their relationship with the poor between personal and professional 
links. The personal links were through extended family, the poor that work in their 
households or their farms and those that beg in the cities. Through these links elites are 
expected to provide financial resources through wages, paying schools fees for 
relatives’ children especially those that have lost their parents through HIV/AIDS, and 
those seeking alms on the streets. For members of parliament, this involved paying fees 
for children in the constituency, paying for funeral costs, and providing financial 
assistance towards development projects such as the construction of boreholes. 
Professionally, the links with the poor are there as as their representatives in parliament, 
or through influence on pro-poor policy from those working in the civil service and the 
provision of goods and services, especially from civil society. There was consensus that 
elites have strong connections with the poor because each one has links with their home 
villages and has experienced poverty at one point in their lives.  
Despite strong views about the interdependence between elites and the poor, elites did 
not feel threatened by the growing presence of the poor in Malawi. They explained that 
the poor are too concerned with survival to cause civil unrest, or be involved in criminal 
activities and are resigned to their fate that they fail to act in any meaningful way. Those 
involved in crime are not the poorest of the poor but lazy people who want to get rich   15
quickly. ‘The poor simply do no have the energy to be involved in crime because they 
would not be able to run away’ (interview with civil society leader, April 2008). The 
factors that increase crime are the high unemployment rates and the breakdown of the 
social security system itself, not poverty. Those elites that identified a link between 
poverty and crime noted that police reports indicate that as inflation increases so does 
crime. However, they tended to compare Malawi to neighbouring countries pointing out 
that Malawi’s crime does not have the same impact as in other countries.  
However, an analysis of parliamentary proceedings indicates that elites are concerned 
with growing crime in Malawi. During discussions on a bill to tighten judicial 
procedures for dealing with criminals, elites expressed concern that those who are better 
off lived in fear of criminals as they were their main targets. They noted that growing 
crime deterred investment in Malawi and has an effect on the county’s growth. It was 
argued that crime was a result of lack of economic empowerment of the Malawian 
people and lack of responsibility on the part of the poor towards development (National 
Assembly debates, 34th session, 27 June 2000). 
Although elites did not directly link poverty to crime, they indicated a strong link 
between poverty and disease. It was argued that poor people are more prone to disease 
because of poor nutrition and poor sanitation. Elites felt that they are highly insulated 
from diseases and crime because they have security, they are able to travel abroad for 
education and medical care. ‘I cannot take my family to a hospital that I know is below 
standards but that does not mean I am doing nothing to change the situation’ (interview 
with minister, May 2008). Other elites felt that the evidence from HIV/AIDS, which is 
attacking both rich and poor, is an indication that elites are not insulated from diseases 
that the poor have. Elites noted that many girls from poor households flock into the 
cities in search of money and they end up in prostitution. Their targets are the elites and 
that can be how elites are getting HIV/AIDS.  
Table 4: Coping strategies of the vulnerable segments of society 
 
Strategy Rural  Urban  National 
Begging 4.8  1.6  3.2 
Assistance from relatives  67.6  45.3  56.5 
Assistance from friends  40.7  50.9  45.8 
Charitable organizations  1.4  3.0  2.2 
Street vending  5.1  8.2  6.6 
Past savings  13.2  28.6  20.8 
Working for food  17.3  2.0  9.7 
Prostitution 0.9  0.9  0.9 
Selling used clothes  1.2  4.5  2.8 
Buying second hand clothes  13.9  17.5  15.7 
Sending kids to relatives  3.9  1.8  2.8 
Other 57.6  2.7  40.4 
Source: Chilowa et al. (2000) cited in Chinsinga (2002: 31). 
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A recurring element in the study was that social networks that connect elites and the poor 
have a direct impact on elite welfare. This observation is consistent with a study carried 
out by Chilowa et al. (2000) that identified assistance from relatives as the poor’s major 
coping strategy (see Table 4). Political elites pointed out that apart from extended 
family; they have had to cater to the needs of their constituents. They were weary of the 
demands pressed on them that they indicated that they have called on civil society to 
educate Malawians on the role of a member of parliament. It was the custom to find 
constituents at the offices of several ministers I was interviewing asking for schools 
fees, transport to return to the constituency, employment, and so on. Elites noted that 
since government provided ambulances to the rural areas, calls on members of 
parliament to pick up sick people to transport them to the hospital, even the dead to the 
mortuary, have reduced. Bureaucratic and civil society elites expressed concern over 
their failure to personally develop or lead a comfortable lifestyle due to pressure from 
extended families. There was consensus that social networks are breaking down and that 
charitable works should not rest solely on elites.  
5.4  Poverty reduction as a priority—not beyond the budget 
A look at Malawi’s budget indicates that priority has been given to the reduction of 
poverty and at least 70 per cent of the budget goes towards poverty-related 
expenditures. Elites agreed that this suggests that poverty is a priority but they argued 
that few have had have had much impact on poverty. Elites were concerned that Malawi 
cannot develop with the present levels of poverty but argued that poverty reduction 
should not be tackled in isolation from economic growth policies. Elites noted that to 
effectively deal with poverty, Malawi should stop developing multiple policies and 
begin to develop consistent, sustainable and coherent policies. The pro-poor policies 
developed need to be comprehensive enough to ensure that there is no constant shifting 
of position or direction.  
Elites are aware that poverty exists but they point out that this does not translate into 
poverty reduction. ‘We need to find ways of pricking the conscious of all elites about 
poverty. There is no evidence to show that we are putting a premium on poverty 
reduction. Our government and elites in general are not doing enough to reduce poverty’ 
(Speaker of Parliament). Elites differentiated the priority given towards poverty 
reduction between the Banda, Muluzi, and Mutharika regime. They felt that under 
Banda things worked well and there is need to study the time before Malawi started 
receiving donor funds as this was the most economically successful time. The Muluzi 
regime is considered to have displayed less interest in reducing poverty despite being its 
main policy and receiving large amounts of donor funds towards alleviation. Although 
there was a belief that this was improving under Mutharika, elites noted that there is 
need for more champions of poverty reduction.  
Some elites argued that failure to prioritize poverty was because elites benefit from the 
existence of poverty. The poor provide access for elites to cheap labour, votes, and 
employment. ‘Elites are benefiting from working within the HIV/AIDS industry and 
would not want to see poverty reduced. Even our donors, if there was no poverty, they 
would be out of a job’ (interview with civil society leader, April 2008). The fact that the 
Malawian population is uneducated, fear authority, and is not confident, is a source of 
gains for the elites. One respondent noted that one often hears comments from 
opposition parties that ‘if only there was hunger or the roads were in bad shape, we 
could win the elections in 2009’. Other elites disagreed with this notion arguing that   17
there is no one who would want poverty to remain at present levels, arguing that it 
would actually be better if the poor were better off. Most elites run businesses and rely 
on the poor to buy their products and if there were less poor people, government would 
reduce its expenditure towards them to more productive areas. 
5.5  The poor should help themselves out of poverty 
Despite consensus that there should be no distinction between deserving and 
undeserving poor, elites tended to offer policies that favoured the active poor. Policies 
such as public works, subsidies, microfinance were favoured over cash transfers or old 
age pensions (see Table 5). The first six highlighted policy choices in Table 5 illustrate 
these preferences and also show elites’ choice of education and primary health care as 
favourable. These two policies are considered as enabling the poor to be more active, 
for instance education will help the poor to be innovative and spot opportunities. On the 
other hand, primary health care will ensure that people are healthy to contribute actively 
to development. It was common for elites to argue that sometimes no matter what 
government does to reduce poverty the poor do not work hard. Therefore, it is important 
to choose between cash for work programmes, cash transfers, pensions or food for work  












Micro finance  66  9  4  9  86 
Public works programme  61  12  9  4  86 
Free and universal 
primary education  60  23  1  2  86 
Fertilizer subsidies 51  28  3  4  86 
Free and universal 
primary health services  51  29  2  4  86 
National safety nets 
programme  41 23 13 9  86 
Old age pensions  37  31  6  12  86 
Cash transfers/ direct 
welfare  transfers  27 29 12  18  86 
Popular housing 
programmes 26  43  2  15  86 
Child benefits  25  35  4  44  86 
Free University education  18  44  4  20  86 
Minimum income for 
different age groups  18  30  6  32  86 
Food distribution 
programmes  17 34 14  21  86 
Unemployment  insurance  13 33 11  29  86 
Source: see text.   18
programmes. Elites indicated that cash transfers were handouts, which create 
dependency and targets an unproductive sector. They were concerned that it would be 
difficult to raise taxes to accommodate cash transfers or the social protection policy in 
general. ‘Yes I am my brother’s keeper but the poor also have a responsibility towards 
poverty reduction. I am not saying all poor people are lazy’ (speaker of parliament).  
Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires both found that elites saw education as 
the main avenue out of poverty. Education was viewed in terms of awareness of 
responsibilities, ability to take advantage of markets and exploit available resources. 
There were strong sentiments that there is need to invest in the manufacturing sector and 
continue to improve agriculture through diversification.  
5.6  Faith in government capability to steer pro-poor policy 
Government was named as the institution that should take full responsibility towards 
poverty reduction. Government was seen as better coordinated than the private sector 
and also responsible for the delivery of goods and services. However, elites noted that to 
succeed in reducing poverty, coordination was important among the different categories 
of elites, from those in power, opposition, civil servants, civil society, donor 
community, the media, and the poor themselves. Coordination should be from planning 
through to implementation and poverty reduction should become the goal of all 
Malawians. They should be united and develop a sense of nationalism.  
The media was seen as very important for changing the discourse within the Malawian 
society which is seen as ‘obsessed’ with issues of personality politics compared to 
development issues. The media was seen as a tool for changing the mindsets of the poor 
towards work and development. There was agreement that Malawians needed to move 
away from Banda’s four cornerstones of unity, obedience, loyalty, and discipline which 
still dictate their behaviour.  
However, elites were concerned that the high corruption rate within the civil service 
goes unnoticed and that there is need to strengthen accountability systems within 
government. The anti-corruption bureau, National Audit Office, Public Procurement, 
and Public Prosecutions were identified as the institutions that needed immediate 
restructuring to be more effective so that real change can take place.  
Elites felt that civil society in Malawi does not provide an alternative voice to 
government and were concerned that they were driven by donor interests and not the 
interests of the poor. They noted that civil society was not transparent in the way their 
funds are spent nor accountable to the people on whose behalf they source funding.  
6 Conclusion 
The argument that elites need to develop a social consciousness in order to form and 
implement pro-poor policy effectively suggests a development of ideological and 
pragmatic concerns (Bird 2007). Elites in Malawi are not threatened by crime or by the 
fear that the poor might start a rebellion. This could be because elites are provided with 
security through their employment as ministers, principal secretaries, heads of civil 
society organizations or parastatals and others invest in private security. While they see 
a correlation between disease and poverty, they do not think that it presents a threat to 
their own lives.    19
Elites in Malawi clearly support education as the best mechanism for reducing poverty. 
They believe that this will facilitate development in that the poor are able to take 
advantage of policy or resources provided as well as start to demand from government 
and effectively participate in development. In similar studies in South Africa, Brazil, 
Bangladesh, and Uganda, education was advocated because through education everyone 
can get richer without the need for redistribution (Bird 2007). Elites in Malawi also 
perceive education as an enabler to take action to change one’s fate, in this case poverty.  
The evidence indicates that elites refused to overtly adopt individualistic theories that 
apportion blame for poverty towards the poor themselves. They argued that the poor 
were not necessarily lazy, but the elites were concerned that the poor’s fatalistic 
attitudes lead them to accept their life as normal. Therefore, the poor are not inclined to 
work hard because they are resigned to poverty as a way of life. They feel marginalized, 
distant from the government and live for the present, which is self-perpetuating and is 
passed on to future generations. Inadvertently, these arguments indicate that elites place 
the blame for the existence of poverty in Malawi on the poor. The poor are therefore 
considered to hold behaviours, values and deviant attitudes different from the rest of 
society which makes them unable or unwilling to take advantage of emergent 
opportunities (Moore 2001 in Bird 2007). It is these innate characteristics of poor 
people that influence policies that target the deserving and undeserving poor.  
The impact of social networks on the welfare of elites highlights the coping strategies 
used by the poor to survive in the midst of poor policy implementation or political and 
environmental conditions. These strategies have been used in Malawi since the 
introduction of a dual policy which created a demarcation between the haves and have-
nots. It became the norm that the poor relied on the rich in society to survive and this 
has continued to the present. In the absence of government interventions on social 
policy the poor resorted to seeking alternative means of survival (see Table 4). 
A lack of access to health facilities has led the poor to seek traditional medicine and 
treatment; lack of adequate water facilities has forced households to revert to unsafe and 
unclean sources; and the dwindling economic activities in the rural areas has led to 
urbanization. This has resulted in slums where many of the social amenities such as 
water, sanitation, and electricity are unavailable. In addition to lack of employment, this 
situation has made the lives of the poor worse (Chilowa et al. 2000 cited in Chinsinga 
2002: 31). Other studies (Chirwa and Chilowa 1997; Pearce et al. 1996) have identified 
similar coping strategies, emphasizing the reliance on social networks of friends or the 
extended family. However, with the influence of patron-client relations Lwanda (1996 
cited in Gilman 2002) argues that the poor’s preoccupation with survival has led to 
more individualistic solutions rather than mass movement for change. The strategy of 
the poor has been to do what they can; through voting, belonging to a party, attending 
meetings and dancing at political rallies, to increase their chances of meeting their basic 
needs. 
These vertical relationships that the poor have with the elites are likely to be the source 
of influence to act towards poverty reduction, especially if they are associated with 
personal safety and economic security. Elites are well aware of the impact crime, 
disease and the possibility of uprisings has on their welfare. However, elites have failed 
to fully connect these to the existence of poverty and therefore develop a consciousness 
that makes them react more responsibly in supporting pro-poor policy.  
Malawian elites are clearly concerned about the levels of poverty and feel that solutions 
to reduce poverty exist. The main solutions advocated towards poverty reduction have   20
targeted the productive or deserving poor with policies such as education and subsidies. 
The cases of UK and USA welfare systems point to the importance of the formation of 
interdependence between elites and the poor that has an impact on their welfare through 
crime, disease, and civil unrest. This is the main area in which the Malawi elite social 
consciousness is not fully developed. Elites do not fear the negative consequences of 
poverty and inequality and elites seem more concerned about the impact social networks 
such as family have on their own welfare. There was effort at collective solutions 
through passing of tougher laws to deal with criminals, but elites still sought 
individualistic solutions, such as personal security.  
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